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INTRODUCTION
A generation of national struggle over school desegregation policy has
shown that the only thing that is worse for social science than being ignored
altogether is being taken too seriously too soon. The original Brown case went
to the Supreme Court accompanied by a brief by dozens of prominent social
scientists affirming the damaging character of segregation. The South pre-
sented its own social science evidence against desegregation.1 Although the
Supreme Court made only passing reference to social science in its 1954 deci-
sion 2 and none at all in the school decisions that followed, social scientists
claimed major credit for the victory, and Southern opponents based much of
their criticism on the claim that the Court had abandoned its proper role by
considering speculative academic social science research in place of law.
The controversy only deepened in the 1970s when some social scientists
began to attack the urban school desegregation orders of the federal courts.
Articles claiming that the unpopular busing policy produced no academic
gains for black children 3 and accelerated white abandonment of city public
schools 4 received extraordinary national attention from the press and policy-
makers. Judges were confronted with social scientists testifying for diametri-
cally opposed policies, and bitterness among some leading researchers became
notorious.5 Some school districts even funded large-scale social science re-
search to prove that desegregation should not be implemented.' School dis-
tricts and civil rights advocates have each developed a coterie of social scien-
tists who regularly appear as witnesses and consultants in school desegregation
litigation.
* Associate Professor. Political Science Dept.. University of Illinois. After this article was
drafted, the author had the opportunity to try out some of the ideas proposed here while serving
as chairman of the Illinois Office of Education's Technical Assistance Committee on the Chicago
Desegregation Plan and as a court-appointed expert in the Los Angeles school desegregation
case.
1. ARGUMENT 60-61 (L. Friedman ed. 1969).
2. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 at n.Il (1954).
3. See, e.g.. Armor, The Evidence on Busing, 28 PUB. INTEREST 90 (1972).
4. See, e.g., J. COLEMAN, S. KELLY & J. MOORE, TRENIDS IN SCHOOL INTEGRATION, 1968-73
(Aug. 1978) (Urban Institute Paper No. 722-03-01) [hereinafter cited as J. COLEMAN].
5. See Pettigrew, Useem, Normand & Smith, Busing: A Review of "The Evidence," 30 PUB.
INTEREST 88 (1973); Armor, The Double Double Standard: a Reply, 30 PUB. INTEREST 119 (1973).
6. See the discussion of the Los Angeles and St. Louis studies, infra.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
This public attention has been a new experience for social scientists who
have traditionally received little notoriety compared to celebrities in science
economics, law, and other professions. Authors of relatively modest articles on
school busing have sometimes found themselves at the center of a national
media barrage and deluged with invitations to make cosmic statements on the
future of cities they have never visited.
The attention, however, has served to highlight and even intensify internal
divisions within the scholarly community, both on methodology and analytic
assumptions. Moreover, a series of emotional disagreements has surfaced
about the role scholars should play in public disputes about the future of
American race relations. These problems have been magnified by mass media
coverage, which has often selectively and inaccurately reported the scholarly
disputes, and hopelessly muddled the difference between the empirical find-
ings of a given scholar and the political judgments he may reach as a citizen.
Of course, scholars themselves sometimes blur this distinction.
The involvement of scholars in school desegregation cases has created
deep fissures within the universities, and between the academic world and
civil rights leaders, public officials, and antibusing groups. Although most
school desegregation research is motivated by a desire to contribute to a better
understanding of racial problems and wise public policy, the transmission of
research findings has proved to be a difficult and even perilous process. The
effort has real costs, and there are serious questions about whether there have
been any compensating gains.
The fact remains that there is no satisfactory alternative to using the best
available social science data in developing remedies for segregation. Although
the social sciences may not always be relevant in determining whether city
school officials have violated constitutional requirements, they provide impor-
tant insights into the kind of school desegregation plan that is likely to work
best, which legal analysis alone cannot do. Although social science may not
always have the final answers on many issues, in a number of cases the re-
search findings are sufficiently clear and consistent to show that a particular
approach is more likely to work than another. The alternative to using social
science data and findings is to rely on the hunches and common sense of
judges and lawyers about very complex issues of urban demography, educa-
tional policy, and other fields in which they usually have no professional train-
ing and little knowledge of what has happened in other cities across the na-
tion.
There are a number of obstacles, however, to the effective use of social
science research. This article examines several aspects of the problem:
1. the selective perceptions of the research by the media and
policymakers;
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2. the way social science concepts reshape the character of the de-
segregation debate;
3. the deepening distrust of social scientists by civil rights leaders;
4. the contradictions between some research findings and the no-
tions about social reality embodied in current desegregation plans.
After examining these obstacles and problems, the article concludes with a
discussion of the needs of judges, administrators, and elected officials who
must make decisions and devise plans regardless of the academic conflicts and
confusions that persist in some areas of desegregation research.
I
SELECTIVE PERCEPTIONS OF THE RESEARCH: THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA
Most social science research is simply irrelevant to decisionmakers because
they do not know it exists. Generally, research appears only in obscure
scholarly journals or in mimeographed reports to federal agencies or private
foundations. Under such circumstances, the only possible impact is indirect:
the research can influence the work of other scholars in the field and of
technically-skilled journalists. Eventually it may be incorporated in more
widely read works.
A social science study may become highly visible either because of the
political clout of its sponsor or because of the apparently novel or newsworthy
character of its principal findings. Occasionally the reputation of the inves-
tigator may also be responsible for its receiving public attention. Some of the
most influential research studies have been sponsored by government agencies
and a handful of the largest foundations, which actively have used the results
to promote particular policies.
The federal government has sponsored only one large-scale study of
school desegregation, the 1966 report Equality of Educational Opportunity (the
Coleman Report).7 This study, produced by a team of academic researchers
working closely with the United States Office of Education, has helped to
shape both the research agenda and the debate over desegregation policy.
Innumerable studies have reanalyzed and reinterpreted the Coleman data.
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights drew heavily on the data for its influen-
tial 1967 report, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools.8
Though the Coleman Report initially received little media attention, it had a
profound effect on academic thinking about desegregation. By the late 1960s,
its basic conclusions were broadly accepted by experts and had begun to in-
7. EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966) [hereinafter cited as the COLEMAN RE-
PORT].
8. 2 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967).
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fluence policy. Although some critics pointed to significant methodological
problems in the report, 9 it was such an advance over previous research that
these questions were not seriously examined for some time.
The major policy conclusions of the Coleman Report were:
1. School desegregation produces an educational gain for black chil-
dren not because of contact with whites but because it is an in-
direct way to put many poor children from families with weak
educational backgrounds in classes where the pace and the expec-
tations are set by a majority of children from more privileged
backgrounds;
2. The positive impact is relatively small in any case, still leaving a
substantial achievement gap between white and minority children;
3. Schools are more important for poor children, while the home
background is more decisive for white middle-class children; de-
segregation has no impact on the achievement of white middle-
class children;
4. Compensatory education is probably a futile strategy, since the
level of spending on schools is not significantly related to the
achievement of children.
The Coleman Report had surprisingly little influence on school desegrega-
tion litigation. Although Hobson v. Hansen, ° one of the first urban school de-
segregation decisions, drew on the report, the precedent-setting urban school
desegregation cases were based on more traditional legal reasoning. The Su-
preme Court's rulings on citywide desegregation in the mid-seventies made no
reference to sociological data.1 1 The research findings of the Coleman Report,
however, provided a rationale for the arguments of desegregation supporters
opposing the wave of angry political criticism triggered by the systemwide
busing plans approved by the Supreme Court. When Congress first consid-
ered legislation restraining the courts, for example, Professor Coleman was an
9. See, e.g., Bowles & Levin, The Deteminants of Scholastic Achievement-An Appraisal of Some Re-
cent Evidence, 3 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 3 (1968).
10. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom., Smuch v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
11. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
Ironically, the Coleman Report may have had more impact on legal challenges to inequitable
school finance systems than to segregated school systems. In its 1973 decision upholding the con-
stitutionality of the system by which Texas distributed school funds, the Supreme Court cited C.
JENCKS, J. COLEMAN, E. CAMPBELL, C. HOBSON, J. MCPARTLAND, A. MOOD, F. WEINFELD & R.
YORK, INEQUALITY (1972), one of the most widely publicized interpretations of the Coleman data,
in support of its decision that federal courts should not interfere in state school financing
schemes. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 43 n.86 (1973).
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important spokesman against the drastic restrictions being considered. 12
Other scholars testifying before the widely publicized Mondale Committee
desegregation hearings also cited the Coleman Report.1 3 The U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights' Racial Isolation in the Public Schools1 4 report was widely circu-
lated among minority groups and educators. Although the Coleman Report
provided desegregation supporters with some useful ammunition, its major
premise-that class rather than race was the key factor-never penetrated the
public discussion.
The second study to become nationally visible was of a very different
character and had a decidedly negative impact on urban school desegregation
efforts. David Armor's article, "The Evidence on Busing," which was pub-
lished in mid-1972, instantly made the young Harvard researcher one of the
most publicized academics in the nation. In his article, Armor claimed that
the Supreme Court had favored integration initially because of the belief that
it would improve the education of black children. 16 Armor, however, con-
cluded on the basis of his analysis of several projects undertaken by other
researchers, and the results obtained in his own study of a small, voluntary
plan in effect in metropolitan Boston, that the Court was wrong. Busing
plans, he said, were ineffective or even counterproductive, regardless of
whether the objective was to improve the achievement levels of blacks, the
educational or occupational aspiration levels of blacks, or relations between
the races.
Coming in the midst of an election-year struggle over antibusing legisla-
tion, at a time when the courts were considering plans for busing between
central cities and their suburbs, 7 this recantation by a Harvard professor who
had once worked for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights received spectacu-
lar media coverage. Public Interest, the journal which published the article took
the unusual step of holding a prepublication press conference, resulting in
the article receiving headline coverage in the Washington Post and other major
newspapers. Within days, the article was cited on the floor of Congress, in ed-
itorials, and in political speeches as scientific evidence that busing was a
12. E.g., Equal Educational Opportunity, Pt. ]A: Hearings Before Senate Select Comm. on Equal Edu-
cational Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 87-134 (April 21, 1970).
13. Hearings and reports of the Mondale Committee (The Senate Select Comm. on Equal
Educational Opportunity) during the 1970-72 period contain numerous references to the Coleman
Report.
14. 2 U.S. COMm'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 8.
15. Armor, supra note 3.
16. Id. at 91.
17. See, e.g., Bradley v. School Board, 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th
Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973) (the Richmond case); Bradley v.
Milliken, (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 1972) (unreported findings of fact and conclusions of law),
modified, 345 F. Supp. 914, aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd and remanded, 418 U.S. 717
(1974) (the Detroit case).
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worthless concept. Armor himself became an important witness at congres-
sional hearings and in a number of school cases.' School districts sought,
unsuccessfully, to use his testimony to convince judges not to order busing.'9
Armor's greatest impact was not on the academic world but on policymak-
ers and the mass media. Although his conclusions were hotly disputed by
other researchers, they entered the national repository of accepted wisdom.
Even those who did not know Armor's name and had never read his article
often cited its basic conclusion as if it were a scientific fact-something that
"research has shown." Rep. Podell (D-N.Y.), for instance, saw it as a reason to
support President Nixon's antibusing bill: "There is no satisfactory evidence
that busing aids the educational process. Most recent educational research
shows that in many cases busing hurts educational progress."2 0 Another
Northern Democrat, Rep. Veysey of Ohio, cited "reliable research studies like
the Armor report" as proof of busing's "adverse effect on the education chil-
dren receive."'"
The concern was not limited to Congress but was shared by the public at
large. Media coverage indicating that there was scientific proof of educational
damage may well have reinforced and heightened concern among parents.
For example, a national survey conducted during the 1972 election period
showed that 27 percent of the public believed that test scores of white chil-
dren had "fallen sharply in desegregated schools." Only about one-third of
the public recognized that this claim was false. 22 Even the leading social sci-
ence critics of busing had made no such charge-Armor, for example, had
found no adverse impact on white students from desegregation. 23
Scholarly rebuttals of Armor's analysis received far less attention from the
media and policymakers. While there was significant coverage of the bitter-
ness and backbiting within the Harvard faculty over the issue, the response by
Thomas Pettigrew and several other scholars 24 received far less substantive
media coverage and almost no attention in Congress. The timing of Armor's
article and its congruence with an emerging white consensus against busing
gave his brief and controversial treatment of the data a powerful and lasting
impact.
18. For example, Armor was the principal social science witness in support of President Nix-
on's antibusing legislation in 1972. Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1972: Hearings before Se-
nate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcomm. on Education, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1194-204 (Sept.
25, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Armor testimony].
19. See, e.g., Northcross v. Board of Educ., 466 F.2d 890, 894 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1972).
20. 118 CONG. REC. 28864 (1972).
21. Id,
22. U.S. Comm. on Civil Rights, Public Knowledge and Busing Opposition (March 11, 1973)
(processed) (based on a survey conducted by Opinion Research Corporation).
23. Armor testimony, supra note 18, at 1196.
24. Pettigrew, Useem, Normand, & Smith, supra note 5.
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School desegregation research again made headlines in early 1975 when
Professor James Coleman delivered a paper at the annual meeting of the
American Educational Research Association on some preliminary results of an
analysis of the causes of "white flight." Coleman and his colleagues found a
statistical relationship between the implementation of school desegregation
plans and the rate of decline in white enrollment in the twenty-two largest
central city school districts. 25 This paper, a highly tentative interpretation,
which included a number of speculative conclusions unrelated to the research,
began to influence national policy even before it was published later that year.
The impact of the paper increased when Coleman gave a series of wide-
ranging interviews, which were carried in major newspapers and on televi-
sion.2 6 Because of his academic stature and his previous notoriety from the
Coleman Report, Coleman's comments and speculations were treated as if they
were proven research findings. Although Coleman soon found himself in-
volved in an angry scholarly debate over his research methods and policy con-
clusions, 27 he began to file depositions in pending court cases, including the
Boston and Louisville cases, urging restraint on busing to avoid massive white
flight. 28 More importantly, Coleman's views were widely accepted by members
of Congress, including those who had once been supporters of school
desegregation, 29 and newspapers across the country saw the study as the re-
jection of busing by one of its most important academic exponents.
A thorough examination of the treatment of the Coleman study by the
most widely-read newspapers and weekly news magazines documented the
highly selective media perception of the scholarly dispute.30 The average pub-
lication carried three and one-half stories on the white flight issue as inter-
preted by Coleman. Although most other scholars who spoke out on the issue
disagreed with either Coleman's methodology or his policy conclusions, 3' and
Coleman himself made major modifications in successive drafts of his paper,
85 percent of the news space devoted to the question uncritically reported
Coleman's initial assertions. More than two-fifths of the publications never
25. J. COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 39.
26. See, e.g., Busing Backfired, Nat'l Observer, June 7, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
27. See, e.g., SYMPOSIUM ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND WHITE FLIGHT (1975) (Sponsored by
the Notre Dame Center for Civil Rights and the Center for National Policy Review).
28. See, e.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 420 n.29 (1st Cir. 1976).
29. Senators Joseph Biden (D-Del.) and Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.), for example, repeatedly
cited the white flight argument to justify their 1977 antibusing legislation. See, e.g., S. 1132, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See also Eagleton on Busing, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 24, 1977, § B, at
2, col. 4.
30. R. Weigel & J. Pappas, Social Science and the Media: Press Coverage of the "White Flight"
Controversy, at 8-10 (1977) (unpublished). See also Taylor, Benjes, & Wright, School Desegregation
and White Flight: The Role of the Courts, in SYMPOSIUM ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND WHITE
FLIGHT, supra note 27, at 69.
31. Professors Weigel and Pappas examined 20 leading publications over a six-month period
in 1975.
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carried a story critical of the Coleman study, and only about one-eighth of the
articles reported any of the specific questions raised about Coleman's re-
search.32 It is not surprising that Coleman's findings entered public debate as
a proven fact rather than as a tentative hypothesis.
Media treatment of new pronouncements by Coleman and Armor in 1978
continued the old pattern. An article by Coleman, based on a speech he had
given five months earlier 33 and containing neither new research nor new
opinions, was published by the Chicago Tribune .3a It immediately became the
focus of widespread press coverage 35 and was cited as "new" evidence by
editorials questioning extensive school desegregation plans.36 The Washington
Post's story on Coleman's views 37 was repeatedly cited in a Senate debate on
an antibusing issue to indicate that Coleman had new research findings that
supported the antibusing position. 3 8
The publicity given to an unpublished study on white flight by David
Armor was even more remarkable. A draft article on white flight Armor had
prepared for delivery at a sociological meeting received major coverage in the
Los Angeles Times,39 in many other papers through the Associated Press wire
service, on the front page of the Washington Post,4" and in a full-page story
32. R. Weigel & J. Pappas, supra note 30, at 8-10.
33. The speech was given in April at Henry Ford Community College in Dearborn, Michigan
and was basically a statement of Coleman's personal views on the value of integration, primarily
in improving the achievement of black children.
34. James S. Coleman, Can We Integrate Our Public Schools Without Busing? Chi. Tribune, Sept.
17, 1978, § 2 (Perspective/Business), at 1, 5.
35. See, e.g., Lawrence Feinberg, Integration Benefits Discounted, Washington Post, Sept. 18,
1978, § A, at 1, 5. The Coleman article was reprinted in the Chicago Sun-Times a little over a week
after it had appeared in the Tribune. James S. Coleman, False Beliefs About School Integration, Chi.
Sun-Times, Sept. 26, 1978, at 39.
36. Chi. Sun-Times, New Look at Integration, Sept. 26, 1978, at 41; The Buses Roll, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 4, 1978, at 18.
37. Note 35 supra. Twenty-four members of the National Review Panel for School Desegrega-
tion Research protested inaccuracies in the news coverage and the failure to report other research
findings. See National Review Panel for Desegregation Research, Press Release, Desegregation
Has Worked, Expert Panel Says (September 29, 1978). In response, the Chicago Tribune published
an article by Robert Crain and Rita Mahard, summarizing their recent research on the academic
effects of school desegregation. Robert L. Crain and Rita E. Mahard, How Integration Can Help
Black Students Achieve, Chi. Tribune, Oct. 8, 1978, § 2 (Perspective/Business) at 1. See Crain &
Mahard, Desegregation and Black Achievement: A Review of the Research, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.,
Summer 1978, at 17.
The Washington Post initially responded to the protest by running two paragraphs on an inside
page at the conclusion of a story about the extent to which blacks are attaining positions on
college faculties. Auerbach, Black College Staff Parity Seen Taking at Least 45 Years, Wash. Post,
Sept. 29, 1978, § A, at 7. Only after repeated requests did it run a response to the Coleman
coverage on its Op-Ed page on October 14, 1978. Willis D. Hawley and Betsy Levin, "Wayward"
Coverage of School Desegregation, Wash. Post, Oct. 14, 1978, § A, at 17.
38. 124 CONG. REC. S16300-16302 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1978).
39. Oliver, Forced Busing Spurs Racial Isolation, Special from Los Angeles Times, in Chicago Sun-
Times, August 23, 1978.
40. Feinberg, Prince George's "White Flight" Seen Linked to Busing Order, Wash. Post, Sept. 25,
1978, § A, at 1, 7.
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in Time magazine. 4 The Time coverage was highly favorable,4 2 criticizing
academics who had "kept busy stomping all over Coleman's findings" on white
flight. This new report by a "Harvard-trained" sociologist, the magazine an-
nounced, had produced "remarkably consistent" findings. Each of the articles
contained at least passing reference to some of the serious criticisms of Ar-
mor's work.4 3 Nonetheless, the coverage was massive and wholly out of pro-
portion with that given to other published and unpublished studies of the
subject. Selective perception was again in operation.
It would be overstating the case, of course, to claim that these few promi-
nently discussed studies changed national policy. On the contrary, they may
have become so prominent because they reflected, and provided a rationale
for, a change in national policy that was already underway. To the extent that
university researchers are thought to be dispassionate scientists who are gen-
erally committed to objective truth, this selective perception of university-
related research findings may have helped to legitimize and camouflage a
general social and political movement away from the integrationist policies of
the sixties.
In view of the controversy surrounding desegregation policies and the ex-
traordinary public attention given to some of the extant research studies, it is
puzzling that the 1966 Coleman Report remains the only national assessment of
the effect of desegregation. Experts in the field, including Coleman himself,
have long conceded that the 1966 study was limited to a narrow range of
issues, hastily studied during a period before any major city had desegre-
gated." 4 Although the need for more sophisticated information concerning
the desegregation process over time has been apparent for years, there has
been no major federal or private effort to find out what is actually happening
in desegregated schools.
Neither side in the national debate over urban school desegregation has
pressed for basic research on this issue. One reason may be that both sides are
so certain of the correctness of their positions that proof seems unnecessary
or even irrelevant. Although both the Nixon and Ford Administrations consis-
41. Forced Busing and White Flight, TIME, September 25, 1978, at 78.
42. Id. The Time report even adopted the "forced busing" rhetoric of desegregation oppo-
nents:
"[T]here is now considerable academic consensus that in large cities a significant linkage
exists between white flight and forced busing. The fact that sociologists show signs of
catching up with everybody else's common-sense observation should be reassuring."
During this same period a number of articles and reports on white flight by prominent scholars
including Reynolds Farley, Christine Rossell and others received very little national press atten-
tion. See, e.g., C. Rossell, Assessing the Unintended Impacts of Public Policy: School Desegrega-
tion and Resegregation (1978) (report prepared for the National Institute of Education); Rossell,
School Desegregation and Community Social Change, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1978, at 133.
43. The Time article noted that Armor's treatment of demographic factors and his theory of
anticipatory white flight had been critized. Supra note 41.
44. See, e.g., ON EQUITY Or EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (F. Mosteller & D.P. Moynihan
eds. 1972).
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tently asserted that busing was damaging to education, 45 and congressional
debates were filled with similar claims, 46 leading opponents of school desegre-
gation have never called for a major research effort. In addition, when the
principal governmental proponent of urban school desegregation, the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, did launch a research enterprise, the project was
jettisoned before any data could be collected. The development of a com-
prehensive multi-year research strategy was funded by the Commission, but
after the report was released, 47 it was quietly shelved, in part because many
minority leaders had concluded that social scientists were hostile to desegrega-
tion.48
More limited, but nonetheless significant, federal evaluations also have
been largely ignored, though they contain positive findings about the effects
of desegregation, a much more complex view of the changes that occur within
schools that undergo desegregation, and important ideas about improving the
desegregation process. A series of reports by the National Opinion Research
Center, the Educational Testing Service, and the Systems Development Cor-
poration analyzed changes over a period of years in a number of individual
classrooms and schools that have been desegregated. The findings of these
exploratory studies all point toward broadly similar requirements for success-
ful desegregation: effective leadership by the principal, staff training pro-
grams, rules that students see as fair, and explicit efforts to teach students
about historical and contemporary American racial and ethnic relationships. 49
Though these studies were substantial research undertakings and produced
significant findings, most were never discussed by the media and never en-
tered the policy debate. Many of those undertaken for HEW were not even
published.
Even a very brief review of a decade of scholarly investigations of the
effects of school desegregation demonstrates that there is little relationship
between the merit of a study and its visibility and influence on policy.
Policymakers share the normal human tendency to heed research findings
45. Statement About Desegregation of Elementary and Secondary Schools, 1970 PuB. PAPERS
304, 307.
46. Notes 20-21 supra & accompanying text.
47. R. CRAIN, D. ARMOR, F. CHRISTEN, N. KING, M. McLAUGHLIN, G. SUMNER, M. THOMAS, &
J. VANECKO, DESIGN FOR A NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (Rand No.
1516, Sept. 1974).
48. See pp. [14-15] infra.
49. 1-2 NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER, SOUTHERN SCHOOLS: AN EVALUATION OF THE
EMERGENCY SCHOOL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1973); G. Forehand,
M. Ragosta, & D. Rock, Conditions and Processes of Effective School Desegregation (1976) (Final
Report of research undertaken by contract with the Dept. of Health, Educ., & Welfare); System
Development Corp., The Third Year of Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA) Implementation
(1977) (Report of Research undertaken by contract with the Office of Education). See also Orfield,
How to Make Desegregation Work: The Adaptation of Schools to their Newly-Integrated Student Bodies, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Spring 1975, at 314.
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that agree with their perceptions. With the exception of a few specialized
journalists, the press continues to cover researchers "not for saying what is
true but for saying what is startling.15 0
II
TRANSFORMATION OF THE DESEGREGATION DEBATE:
RESEARCH AS A SOURCE OF NEW PARADIGMS
Though research on school desegregation is still at a relatively primitive
stage, social science concepts from the academic community have helped
transform the way we speak about and view the desegregation process. In
Brown v. Board of Education,"1 the Supreme Court devoted only one footnote
to social science research. 52 Its decision spoke not of test scores but of the
damage to the "hearts and minds" of black children forced to attend segre-
gated schools.5 3 And since 1954, the school desegregation decisions have not
referred to social science research.5 4 The task, as the Court has seen it, is to
eliminate the evil of officially imposed segregation of black and Hispanic chil-
dren. The appropriate remedy for this constitutional violation is desegrega-
tion.55
Confronted with the problem of measuring whether desegregation
"worked," social scientists began to reshape the issue, often without any con-
scious intent. School districts and governmental agencies naturally turned to
educational researchers for immediate answers and educational researchers
naturally took up their most frequently used instruments, standardized
achievement tests. Though such tests were themselves highly controversial, the
technology of testing was highly developed, familiar, and easy to use. These
tests were usually administered in the fall and the spring of a single school
year, often the first and most difficult year of an unplanned transition to
desegregation.
The choice of achievement test measures set a standard for success and
for "failure" of desegregation. It rested on an assumption not found in the
Brown case-that desegregation could only be justified on the basis of strong
educational gains that presumably would arise merely by placing minority and
white children in the same classroom. Armor took this one step further, by
establishing his own standard-the elimination of the entire yearly increase in
50. Crain, Why Academic Research Fails To Be Useful, 84 SCH. REv. 337 (1976).
51. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
52. Id. at 494, n.Il.
53. Id. at 494.
54. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
55. But see Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science
Research in the Supreme Court, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Autumn 1978, at 57, arguing that, in
the more recent cases, the Court, or at least some of its members, has adopted the position that
"nondiscrimination" rather than integration through busing of pupils is the appropriate remedy.
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the gap between average white and black achievement scores.5 6 Where this
standard-a standard that no educational reform had achieved-was not at-
tained, desegregation was deemed a failure. Use of this unrealistically high
standard led to the conclusion that busing-indeed, desegregation in gen-
eral-had failed. The Supreme Court, Armor determined, had been wrong.
The white flight research has once again transformed the way the school
desegregation issue is viewed. Now neither desegregation itself nor test score
gains are sufficient to support a systemwide plan. If the rate of white subur-
banization increases during the transition year-that is, the first year in which
the desegregation plan is implemented--desegregation is often described as a
failure. The initial problem of racial segregation, viewed from the perspective
of minority children, has been reformulated as a problem of urban neighbor-
hood stability, viewed from the perspective of the central city white. The pol-
icy recommendation Coleman derived from his white flight study57 calls for
very limited or voluntary desegregation. Although the federal government
had once been hailed by Northern intellectuals for forcing desegregation in
Little Rock in 1958 in spite of local resistance 5 8 the new mode of analysis
made local resistance a justification for inaction. For example, in pending
cases in St. Louis, 5 9 Los Angeles, 0 San Diego,6 ' and elsewhere school districts
placed heavy emphasis on specially commissioned social science research and
testimony concerning white flight to support their contention that desegrega-
tion should be strictly limited.6 2
56. Studies have shown that while the average minority pupil scores lower than the average
white pupil on achievement tests at every grade level, the gap between the two groups increases
rather than decreases with more years of schooling. For example, blacks in the metropolitan
Northeast are 1.6 years behind whites in the same region at 6th grade, 2.4 years behind at 9th
grade, and 3.3 years behind at 12th grade. COLEMAN REPORT, supra note 7, at 21.
57. J. COLEMAN, Supra note 4.
58. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
59. A special survey was commissioned by the Board of Education of St. Louis. One unusual
feature of the survey was that the pollsters were provided with copies of a letter from the mayor
urging citizens to cooperate as part of the survey. The study was conducted by the St. Louis Re-
search Group, Inc. Population and Desegregation: City of St. Louis (September 23, 1977) (un-
published report).
60. The Los Angeles telephone survey of possible white flight was directed by David Armor
and conducted by Marylander Marketing Research. See Marylander Marketing Research, note 171
infra. In Crawford v. Board of Education, the results, accompanied by declarations by several social
scientists, were offered as'evidence. See, e.g., Continued Deposition of David J. Armor, Crawford
v. Board of Educ., No. C 822 854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct., June 6, 1977).
61. David Armor conducted research and testified for the school board in the San Diego case
on the white flight issue. His research is cited in Armor, White Flight, Demographic Transition,
and the Future of School Desegregation (Aug. 1978) (paper presented at the American Sociologi-
cal Association Meetings, San Francisco, California).
62. Although the question whether courts should consider the phenomenon of "white flight"
in shaping a desegregation remedy has surfaced in several lower court cases, the Supreme Court
has not yet directly confronted the issue. See discussion in Levin & Moise, School Desegregation
Litigation in the Seventies and the Use of Social Science Evidence: An Annotated Guide, 39 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB., Winter 1975, at 50, 93-98.
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As the language of the research community has come to displace the lan-
guage of the court decisions, we have begun to talk about desegregation in a
strange way: discussion centers on demographic change rates, test score
standard deviations, and indices of self-concept. Rarely is desegregation dis-
cussed as an important end in itself or even as the appropriate remedy for the
deliberate violation of constitutional rights.
III
SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AS THE ENEMY:
THE PERSPECTIVE OF CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS
From World War II until the mid-sixties, civil rights leaders believed they
had important allies in the universities who provided both intellectual support
for the movement and volunteers for direct action. No leading scholar at-
tacked the goal of integration. During the early seventies, however, civil rights
groups discovered that the involvement of social scientists in both the judicial
and legislative process was a double-edged sword that seemed to cut more
powerfully against desegregation than it ever had against segregation. The
research findings of Professors Armor and Coleman were cited in support of
efforts to resist desegregation. Daniel P. Moynihan's Labor Department study,
The Negro Family, seemed to blame the problems of society on the weakness of
the black family. 63 Even the old issue of genetic inferiority was reawakened in
the widely-discussed writings of Arthur Jensen. 64 Civil rights leaders who had
been disappointed by the backlash against affirmative action on campus
feared a revival of turn-of-the-century "scientific racism."'6 5
The crisis produced searing attacks on individual social scientists by prom-
inent civil rights leaders and a deepening distrust of the entire research en-
terprise. Coleman's white flight paper, 66 for example, generated repeated de-
nunciations by the NAACP and such leading black scholars as Kenneth B.
Clark and Robert Green. 67 Constitutional rights, they insisted, must not de-
pend upon the particular approach to the use of the regression equations in
fashion in any given year or the current racial mood in academe. A basic
mistrust grew.
63. U.S. LABOR DEP'T, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1967). For a
critique of this study, see L. RAINWATER & W.L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLI-
TICS OF CONTROVERSY (1967).
64. Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?, 39 HARV. EDUC. REV. 1
(1969).
65. The development of theories of black inferiority by leading social theorists helped to jus-
tify the disenfranchisement of Southern blacks and the ending of Reconstruction era civil rights
protections in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See generally THE DEVELOPMENT
OF SEGREGATIONIST THOUGHT (I. Newby ed. 1968).
66. J. COLEMAN, supra note 4.
67. N.Y. Times, June 25, 1975, at 49, col. 1; id., July 3, 1975, at 23, col. 1; Wash. Post, July 1,
1975, § C, at 1, col. 6.
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As long as the decisions of the federal courts continued to require substan-
tial desegregation in urban school districts, the strategy of civil rights groups
was to treat research as irrelevant while denouncing researchers who recom-
mended less integration. In the 1974-77 period, however, when the Supreme
Court moved to severely constrain the possibility of effective and lasting de-
segregation in many urban centers, the strategy became less viable. The Su-
preme Court's decisions in the Detroit,68 Pasadena, 69 and Dayton 71 cases
showed that the Court had begun to accept a number of propositions about
the nature of urban racial change that precluded significant desegregation in
many cities. Research on these propositions has thus become a matter of
urgency if civil rights lawyers are to avoid erosion of existing legal principles.
At a time when their opponents are actively using and even financing re-
search that supports their position against desegregation, continued opposi-
tion to social science research among integrationists leaves the field to the
critics.
IV
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESEARCH AND POLICYMAKERS' ASSUMPTIONS
ABOUT SOCIETY AND RACIAL CHANGE
A. The Role of Politics
Since 1972, the political intensity of the busing issue has declined and few
new plans have been implemented, yet the assumptions of researchers critical
of busing have become more widely accepted. Busing was not a major issue in
the 1976 election. Yet even though the external pressures had eased, support
for desegregation efforts continued to shrink.
The political character of the issue changed because desegregation had
become routine in much of the South and relatively little was undertaken
in the North. The 1972 election took place in the midst of the South's first
year of large-scale busing,7 also a period when lower federal courts were
ordering metropolitan desegregation.7 2 Four years later the antibusing
groups had disbanded in most of the South, and public attention had
turned to new issues. By 1975, the Supreme Court had ruled against
metropolitan desegregation except in very special circumstances.13 Only one
68. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
69. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 423 U.S. 1335 (1975).
70. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
71. There were far more urban desegregation orders in 1971 and 1972 than in any year since
because it was then a relatively simple matter for civil rights lawyers to file motions to update
existing desegregation orders in the South to meet the new Supreme Court standards articulated
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
72. Note 17supra.
73. See Evans v. Buchanan, 423 U.S. 963 (1975) (summary affirmance); Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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or two Northern cities were desegregating each year.74
Each federal court order seemed to stimulate a new round of antibusing
legislation in Congress. The Detroit litigation7 5 led to the proposal of amend-
ments by several Michigan Congressmen and Senator Robert Giffin (R-
Mich.), 7' and the Boston litigation 77 triggered proposals by Representative Joe
Moakley (D-Mass.). 78 The St. Louis79 and Kansas City, Missouri"0 litigation
brought Senator Thomas Eagleton into the lists, and the Wilmington strug-
gle 8 ' changed the stance of a previously supportive senator, Joseph Biden.8 2
Biden led the 1975 Senate struggle to end the authority of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare to require suburban school desegre-
gation through busing 3 and joined with Eagleton in sponsoring 1977 legisla-
tion 4 even more drastically limiting the Department's powers.8
5
Presidential candidates in 1976 sought some way either to defuse the
busing issue or to identify themselves with the antibusing position. President
Ford attacked the courts and asked Congress to enact a bill that would strictly
limit both the scope and duration of busing orders.88 Ronald Reagan cam-
paigned for the GOP convention's platform and endorsed an antibusing
amendment to the Constitution.
7
Yet the issue never became a major theme in any campaign because early
efforts to exploit it failed. Even in Boston, which had experienced the coun-
try's most severe recent polarization over the issue, Senator Henry Jackson's
widely advertised promises to fight "forced busing" were of little avail. Whites
for whom this was a "voting issue" were much more likely to vote for an
extremist candidate like George Wallace than for a liberal convert to the an-
tibusing wars.8 8 Moreover, Jackson's identification with the issue exposed him
74. See 122 CONG. REC. S7398 (daily ed. May 18, 1976) (record of urban desegregation pre-
pared by U.S. Dep't of Justice).
75. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 275 (6th Cir.
1973); Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
76. S. 179, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 41, 93rd Cong. 1st Sess. (1973).
77. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), aff'd sub noa., Morgan v. Kerri-
gan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
78. H.R. 2392, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
79. United States v. Missouri, 363 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Mo. 1973), enforced, 388 F. Supp. 1058
(E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1975), modified
(E.D. Mo. 1975) (unreported), remanded, 523 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1975).
80. School Dist. v. Missouri, 438 F. Supp. 830 (1977), transferred, 460 F. Supp. 421 (1978), ap-
peal dismissed per curiam, 529 F.2d 493 (1979).
81. Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd mem., 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
82. Wilmington Morning News, June 15, 1974; id.. July 10, 1974.
83. S.J.Res. 119 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Opposition to busing of students (printed) (July
31, 1975).
84. Eagleton-Biden Amendment of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-205, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977).
85. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
86. President's Message to Congress Transmitting the Proposed School Desegregation
Standards and Assistance Act of 1976, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1080 (June 28, 1976).
87. GOP Platform Highlights, CONG. Q. 2296 (Weekly Rep., Aug. 21, 1976).
88. Wash. Post, March 1, 1976, § A, at 4, col. 5.
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to a biting counterattack in the crucial Florida primary where Jimmy Carter
accused Jackson of using an issue "which has connotations of racism."' 9
Carter's own position on the issue was carefully crafted to reflect both the
unpopularity of the issue and its declining importance. Carter hailed the inte-
gration of Southern schools but said that he opposed large-scale busing, and
preferred voluntary plans and increased black control over segregated inner
city school systems. He promised, however, to enforce the law and oppose
efforts to amend the Constitution. The Democratic convention adopted a
statement that was only modestly more supportive, calling busing a "judicial
tool of last resort. '"90 The platform called for active work on other ap-
proaches, including the use of magnet schools.9 1 President Carter avoided the
issue completely during his first year in office. The Justice Department
adopted a more positive attitude, but it neither initiated important new cases
nor pressed for the cross-district plans needed to accomplish integration in
many cities.
92
Pronouncements of candidates and government officials do much to set
the atmosphere within which desegregation plans are shaped. During the
mid-1970s their almost uniform opposition to busing convinced many that
busing itself was the problem. The consequence was a strong tendency to
propose plans requiring a minimum amount of busing. 93 It was assumed that
minimizing busing would diminish opposition to desegregation and enhance
residential stability, although existing research provides no support for these
assumptions.9 4
B. The Empirical Assumptions on which Desegregation Policies Are Based
Explicit or implicit assumptions about society and racial change underlie
the various desegregation policies that are put forward. Although policymak-
ers often claim that their assumptions are supported by research, their infor-
mation about existing research usually is derived through the selective screens
of the media and political debate. One can, however, identify the empirical
89. N.Y. Times, March 4, 1976, at 20, col. 1.
90. 122 CONG. REC. S11580 (daily ed., July 2, 1976).
91. Id.
92. The Department did respond to the requests of federal judges in St. Louis and Cleveland
that it become a participant in pending litigation, but it did not initiate new urban cases. The
Department in the Carter Administration took a more supportive role than the Ford Administra-
tion Justice Department officials had in urging city-wide desegregation in the Dayton case. See
United States' Amicus Curiae brief No. 76-539, Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406
(1977).
93. In Corpus Christi, Texas, the school district reached the illogical extreme of requiring
"massive crosstown walking," assigning 10,000 students to schools up to 1.9 miles outside their
neighborhoods, without providing any transportation. Ozio, Corpus Christi, 15 INTEGRATED EDuc.,
Nov.-Dec., 1977, at 5.
94. But see Rossell, School Desegregation and Community Social Change, supra note 42 at 133.
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assumptions on which specific policy decisions rest and determine the extent
to which they are congruent with or in clear conflict with existing research
findings.
The desegregation plans submitted by school districts and the policies
promoted by Congress and the executive branch in recent years reflect the
following implicit assumptions about the desegregation process:
1. The amount of busing is the principal basis for resistance to de-
segregation; political controversy will be far less severe with less
busing;
2. Large-scale desegregation plans intensify white flight; limited plans
produce greater stability;
3. Voluntary procedures (particularly magnet school plans) can pro-
duce substantial integration;
4. One-way busing is an acceptable solution;
5. Desegregation plans that exclude the early grades are more effec-
tive;
6. Integration of faculties is a significant step even in the absence of
student integration;
7. Bilingual education programs meet the principal needs of His-
panic children and are more effective in ethnically isolated schools
or classrooms;
8. There are alternatives to integregation--e.g., community controlled
schools or compensatory education that may be more effective
than desegregation and are more acceptable to minority as well as
majority children.
In the last two years, some court-ordered plans have come to reflect the
same assumptions, inrplicitly eroding a series of constitutional requirements
that had been articulated in earlier cases. 95
95. The Supreme Court's declaration in the Little Rock case, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958), that public resistance could not be allowed to prevent the enforcement of constituttional
rights seems to militate against restricting the scope of desegregation in order to lessen the extent
of white flight. Restricting the scope ol desegregation plans also appears to violate the mandate of
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), that school systems must eliminate racially
identifiable schools. Plans accepted by some courts fail to comply with the Supreme Court's
unanimous decision in Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 1218 (1969), that
school districts be desegregated immediately once a violation was proven. Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), which upheld systemwide busing where necessary
to disestablish a dual school system, and which held that the burden was on the school district to
demonstrate that one-race schools were not "vestiges" of past de jure segregation, seems to be
ignored. The right of Hispanic children to be educated in a desegregated system, as articulated in
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), is often neglected in the establishment of eth-
nically isolated bilingual programs.
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1. The Return to Freedom of Choice: The Magnet School Moiaement
In perhaps the most important decision since Brown, the Supreme Court
ruled in 1968 that merely offering black students "freedom of choice" to
transfer schools was not enough. 96 To be acceptable, school desegregation
plans must actually uproot the system of separate schools. 97 As a result of this
decision, substantial desegregation occurred in the South.
Ironically, a decade later a new variation of the "freedom of choice" plan
has become the favored approach to desegregation in cities across the coun-
try. The premise of the so-called magnet school plan is that black, Hispanic,
and white students can be attracted in sufficiently large numbers to desegre-
gated schools that offer special educational approaches to make compulsory
busing unnecessary. Magnet schools have become the centerpiece of school
desegregation plans in a number of the nation's largest districts-for example,
St. Louis, San Diego, Houston, Cincinnati, Chicago, Milwaukee, and Philadel-
phia. The magnet school plan is often presented to the community, the press
and the courts as an effective method of ending segregation. The fact that no
large urban district has ever been fully desegregated through the use of
magnet schools is ignored.
It is not surprising that local school authorities proposed the magnet
school idea and that local politicians hailed it, since this would mean no in-
voluntary busing of any children. The surprising thing, however, is the in-
creasingly serious way some courts have treated the issue. Congress further
heightened interest in this approach to desegregation by enacting a law pro-
viding funds for the development of magnet school programs.s Although
nothing in the measure limited the right of the courts to order further de-
segregation, the congressional action did tend to reinforce the notion that
magnet schools were a serious alternative solution.
During 1977 virtually all of the large urban school desegregation cases on
the West Coast involved magnet school plans. The Pasadena school board in-
cluded magnet schools in its desegregation plan and appealed to have the
compulsory features of the federal court order dropped. The state court
judge in the San Diego case accepted a plan that provided that 3,000 of the
district's 120,000 children would be enrolled in integrated magnet schools.
96. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). The Court did not hold that a "free-
dom of choice" plan might in itself be unconstitutional, but stressed that such plans would not be
permitted where alternatives "promis[ed] speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary,
nonracial school system" existed. Id. at 439, 440-41.
97. Id. at 437-38.
98. Emergency School Aid Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 321(a)-(c), 90 Stat. 2216-17
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1603, 1606, 1619 (1976); 122 CONG. REC. S5733 (daily ed., April 14,
1976). The bill was introduced by Ohio's Senator John Glenn, who was reacting to the fact that
five of the largest districts in his state were facing court orders to desegregate.
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Since some of the magnet schools were already in operation, the plan was to
involve only 1,100 additional transfers, less than 1 percent of the district's
enrollment. The remainder of the plan provided for the establishment of
specialized classes in which students from various schools could participate for
a portion of the school day. The district planned to bus a total of 900
additional children later in the school year to learning centers one day a week
for integrated classes in music and art. 99
Judge Louis Welsh, an elected judge who would have to run again for
office, accepted the school district's proposals, reserving judgment on whether
additional steps would be mandated if the voluntary plan failed. The court
order actually required that only four additional magnet schools be estab-
lished, offering curricula in government and law enforcement, schools teach-
ing foreign languages by the immersion method, and elementary schools em-
phasizing fundamentals. 10 0 School desegregation experts for the state of
California ranked the chances for the success of this plan very low, noting
that "no city in the nation has met a court order to desegregate its schools by
using voluntary programs only." '
Another California state judge, Paul Egly, accepted a magnet school plan
for the San Bernardino school system, which has a total enrollment of only
31,000 students. The city proposed to desegregate its fifteen most segregated
elementary schools by offering special magnet programs in each part of town.
In addition, there were to be two-week interracial visits between white and
minority schools. NAACP Attorney Nancy Reardan claimed that although the
voluntary programs might succeed in moving some black children out of
segregated schools, "no voluntary program in California" had brought white
volunteers in sufficient numbers to desegregate a ghetto or barrio school. She
also objected to the school district's definition of an integrated school as one
with an 80 percent white student body.0 2
Although the Los Angeles School District's desegregation plan, which in-
volved little more than voluntary part-time busing of middle grade intermedi-
ate level students, had been rejected as inadequate by the California judge,"0 3
a program of magnet schools and voluntary transfers was the only plan in op-
eration in the fall of 1977, pending the development of a more extensive
desegregation plan. Two new magnet schools had a voluntary enrollment of
700 children, desegregating about 0.1 percent of the district's students. The
voluntary transfer plan, long the city's only desegregation effort, attracted
18,500 students in 1977, about 3 percent of the district's students and a large
99. San Diego Union, Aug. 6, 1977.
100. Id.
101. Id., Aug. 25, 1977.
102. L.A. Times, Aug. 8, 1977, § 1, at 20, col. 4.
103. Crawford v. Board of Educ., 17 C.3d 280, 551 P.2d 28 (1976).
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increase over the previous year.10 4 A more extensive plan to desegregate
grades four through eight was implemented in September 1978, after the
court rejected a purely voluntary approach.
Seattle is yet another major Western community that decided to rely ini-
tially on a voluntary approach. 0 5 The 59,000 student system, which had
never been under a court order to desegregate, opened classes in the fall of
1977 with approximately 4,000 children being bused to twenty-eight city
schools offering a variety of magnet programs, which were not necessarily
integrated with the regular classes in a given school. The sole integrated ex-
perience of some of the children was in the lunchroom. 106 The Seattle school
board responded to the inadequacies of the approach by implementing a
mandatory plan in fall of 1978.
The principal desegregation effort in the Upper Midwest continues to re-
volve around the magnet school approach. The first two years of the Mil-
waukee desegregation plan relied almost completely on voluntary transfers by
minority children to schools with specialized curricula."0 7 Even before the
court order, the district's superintendent of schools had been planning large
experiments of this type in the hope of retaining the system's middle class
white families. By the fall of 1977, out of a total enrollment of approximately
100,000, 14,000 children, nine-tenths of whom were black, were being bused
to magnet schools.'
Buffalo, New York-the only major system in the state of New York to
come under a federal court order-also relied on magnet schools. Judge John
T. Curtin accepted a plan for the establishment of eight new magnet schools
in lieu of a more extensive desegregation plan.10 9 The school district had pre-
viously closed ten schools and opened one magnet school. 1 0
Reliance on magnet schools to desegregate occurred even in districts
where the practical obstacles to desegregation were relatively minor. For
example, in Chula Vista, California, where the busing of only 250 students
was required for desegregation, the district abandoned its agreement to de-
segregate when the federal government provided only half the $300,000 the
system had requested. Instead a limited magnet school program was adopted,
104. L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1977, § 2, at 1, col. 5.
105. In December 1977, the Seattle school authorities adopted a mandatory plan, recognizing
that a totally voluntary approach would fail. Seattle Times, Dec. 15, 1977, at 1; N.Y. Times, Jan.
3, 1978, at 1, col. 5.
106. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Sept. 8, 1977, § A. at 5, col. 4.
107. Amos v. Board of School Directors, 408 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd sub nom.,
Armstrong v. Brennan, 539 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 672 (1977).
108. Milwaukee J., Aug. 14, 1977, § 2 at 1, col. 1; id., Sept. 6, 1977. Id., Sept. 13, 1977.
109. Arthur v. Nyquist, 415 F. Supp. 904 (W.D. N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 429 F. Supp. 206 (W.D.
N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1978).
110. Buffalo Evening News, Aug. 10, 1977.
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which was designed to reach no more than a third of the students."1 '
Even the largest school systems resorted to magnet school solutions in spite
of the fact that the record had been highly disappointing to similar districts in
the past. Chicago, which had two magnet schools, responded to heavy pres-
sure from the Illinois State Board of Education with a first stage plan for
1977 that bused 700 children out of overcrowded ghetto schools. The city's
planning for future desegregation emphasized five more years of voluntary
efforts costing $50 million a year." 2 The Los Angeles plan" 3 remained par-
tially voluntary for the 1978-79 school year, though there was a provision for
limited mandatory desegregation in grades four to eight." 4
The popularity of magnet schools and other voluntary approaches grew
even as the research evidence on their failure to achieve desegregation be-
came increasingly unambiguous. Though negative research findings seem to
have a powerful impact in eroding support for remedies to segregation, nega-
tive evidence has no discernible impact on the belief that there are alternatives
to busing.
Perhaps the most important test of magnet schools was in Houston, where
the plan called for moving 5,000 students from their neighborhood schools to
magnet schools. It fell far short of its goal, however. In 1970, the school sys-
tem had developed a limited desegregation plan that was also a failure.
Schools enrolling almost 18,000 minority children but only 1,700 Anglos had
been paired. Under this plan, 6,000 Mexican American children were counted
as white. Four years later, the segregated nature of the eleven sets of paired
schools had significantly worsened, with only about 3 percent of the total re-
maining population in the "desegregated" schools being Anglo." 5 The failure
of this pairing plan and the need for further steps led to the development of
a very extensive magnet school approach. Thirty-four new programs were
implemented in 1975 and another eleven in 1976. When the program began,
3,167 students transferred, but a number of schools involved remained highly
segregated."
6
Although Houston's desegregation plan had left the white population
virtually untouched, the city still suffered the rapid decline in Anglo enroll-
ment so characteristic of large cities, falling from 125,000 in 1970 to 83,000 in
111. San Diego Union, Aug. 4, 1977.
112. Chi. Daily News, Sept. 8, 1977, at 1, col. 2; Chi. Trib., Dec. 6, 1977, at 2, col.1
113. Discussed supra notes 103 and 104 and accompanying text.
114. Crawford v. Board of Educ., No. C 822, 854 (Super. Ct. of Cal., Feb. 7, 1978) (unpub-
lished minute order); Los Angeles City Board of Education, 1 Los Angeles Plan for Student Inte-
gration: Integrated Educational Excellence Through Choice (Mar. 12, 1979).
115. Campbell & Brandstetter, The Magnet School Plan in Houston, in THE FUTURE OF BIG-
CITY SCHOOLS: DESEGREGATION POLICIES AND MAGNET ALTERNATIVES 124-38 (D. Levine & R.
Havighurst eds. 1977).
116. Id. at 137.
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1975.1 Critics of course attributed the "flight" of 42,000 students to de-
segregation, though there had been no busing plan and less than 2,000 white
children had ever been involved in involuntary pairing.
The record was similar in St. Louis. There the federal court initially had
permitted an out-of-court settlement that attempted to expand integration in
the city through voluntary transfers. I t ' Very few schools were desegregated
under the plan.119 Civil rights groups, with Justice Department support, sued
for further action.
120
Magnet programs in other cities had records ranging from modest positive
to negligible consequences. In Cincinnati, which had made an ambitious mag-
net program the centerpiece of its plan, about one-sixth of the students were
enrolled in some kind of alternative school by fall 1975 and the level of
segregation in the city was slightly lowered. However, even under the most
optimistic projections of local school officials, six-tenths of the students would
remain outside the program.1 2 1 The Chicago school system failed to attract
white students to its second highly publicized and highly expensive magnet
school. Flint, Michigan-a relatively small system heavily supported by the
Mott Foundation-succeeded in transferring two-fifths of its student enroll-
ment to magnet schools programs. Nevertheless, thirteen schools remained as
segregated as ever, with more than 90 percent black students. 122 Most of the
magnet schools in Dallas fell far short of their goals, with some remaining
"essentially one-race schools."1 2 3
Despite this record, when the long-delayed Philadelphia school desegrega-
tion case came to a head in the Pennsylvania state courts the magnet school
idea again was relied upon. After nine years of enforcement efforts by the
state Human Relations Commission and a favorable state supreme court rul-
ing, 2 4 the state trial court held that the school district only need implement
its voluntary magnet school plan and granted the district another eighteen
months' delay to plan for further desegregation. 2 5 The superintendent, how-
117. Id. at 138.
118. Liddell v. St. Louis Bd. of Educ., 72C-100(1) (E.D. Mo.) (settled Dec. 24, 1975).
119. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 6, 1977, § A, at 3, col. 5.
120. The NAACP intervened pursuant to an order by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, Dec. 13, 1976, and the Justice Department intervened July 27, 1977. The District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri held that the St. Louis School authorities had met the burden
of showing that they had not acted with segregative intent and that all parties were bound by the
prior settlement. Liddell v. Board of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo., 1979).
121. Waldrip, Alternative Programs in Cincinnati or "What Did You Learn on the River Today?", in
THE FUTURE OF BIG-CITY SCHOOLS: DESEGREGATION POLICIES AND MAGNET ALTERNATIVES 95 (D.
Levine & R. Havighurst eds. 1977).
122. Grant, Flint, 15 INTEGRATED EDUC., Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 18.
123. Trombly, Dallas, 15 INTEGRATED EDUC., Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 20.
124. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. School Dist., 23 Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 312, 352 A.2d
200 (1976).
125. Pennsylvania Hum. Rel. Comm'n v. School Dist., 30 Pa. Commw. Ct. 644, 374 A.2d 1014
(1977), aff'd, 480 Pa. 398, 390 A.2d 1238 (1978).
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ever, announced that the school board probably would not have the necessary
money to implement even the voluntary plan, which state officials estimated
would integrate no more than 10 to 15 percent of the city's students. 126
The magnet approach had been chosen in spite of Philadelphia's own
prior experience with seven magnet schools. Four of the seven magnet high
schools were at least 95 percent black. The only increase in integration had
occurred at the magnet school offering aerospace studies where an almost
all-white school had attracted about 5 percent more blacks. One magnet
school enrolling 3,200 pupils had a total of two white students.1 27
The evidence showed that magnet schools and other "freedom of choice"
procedures worked best when they were used not as a substitute for a compul-
sory plan but as a component of such a plan. When desegregation is inevita-
ble, the development of magnet school curricula can add an important
element of educational choice to the process. Boston children, who were re-
quired by court order to be bused, 2 ' were attracted in large numbers to the
special schools developed in the Phase II plan.129 Under a clear judicial man-
date to implement a compulsory reassignment plan in those schools that could
not be desegregated on a voluntary basis,' 30 the Milwaukee school staff de-
veloped great interest in encouraging transfers. Without a framework requir-
ing a mandatory change, neither the school administration's interest in mak-
ing the program work nor the parents' interest in avoiding a forced reassign-
ment is brought into play.
2. One-Way Desegregation
Most magnet plans, particularly those in big cities, rely primarily on trans-
fers of minority children to schools in white or transition areas. Even when
there is mandatory reassignment, policymakers often try to minimize white
fears by closing minority schools and busing their students out to white areas.
This trend was evident in several plans adopted in 1977. The very limited
Kansas City, Kansas, plan closed a black school and bused 490 children to
other schools.13 1 In Fort Wayne, Indiana, three all-black neighborhood schools
were closed, and nearly 700 black children were sent elsewhere. 32 Virtually
all of the thousand involuntary transfers as well as the great majority of vol-
untary changes in Milwaukee involved minority children.' 33 The Portland,
126. Phil. J.-Herald, July 2, 1977.
127. Franklin, Magnet Schools Fail in Philadelphia, INTEGRATED EDUC., Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 95.
128. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.), aff'd sub nom., Morgan v. Kerrigan,
509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
129. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 246-48 (D. Mass. 1975).
130. Amos v. Board of School Directors, 408 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd sub nom.,
Armstrong v. Brennan, 539 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 672 (1977).
131. Kansas City Times, Aug. 29, 1977, § A, at 4, col. 1.
132. Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, Sept. 7, 1977; Fort Wayne J.-Gazette, Sept. 7, 1977.
133. Milwaukee J., Aug. 14, 1977, § 2 at 1, col. 1.
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Oregon, school superintendent rejected busing for white children but permit-
ted the busing of 2,700 minority children from their neighborhood schools."l 4
Superintendent Blanchard had proposed to avoid resegregation by expanding
the number of minority students to be bused. I35 In Delaware, the State Board
of Education proposed to desegregate the entire Wilmington metropolitan
area using one-way busing of minority students, but this extreme proposal was
rejected by the federal court. 136
There is no social science evidence to suggest that one-way desegregation
is superior, and such plans frequently generate overt opposition in parts of
the minority community. There was extensive criticism of such plans by the
minority communities in Milwaukee and Portland, for example, and black
groups filed a lawsuit in Fort Wayne, Indiana, to stop one-way busing.137
Black parents strongly criticized a one-way plan in Joliet, Illinois.13 S The plans
were formulated not in response to evidence about the way to desegregate
most effectively but in response to evidence about what the white community
would accept. Polls showing whites more ready to accept one-way plans are
taken seriously. 1 3 9 Research suggesting that the white fear of violence in
schools in black neighborhoods has no basis in fact is ignored. 40
3. Desegregating Everything but the Students
Under intense political pressures against school busing, much of the en-
forcement energy of the executive branch has focused in recent years on de-
segregating teachers while student segregation remains untouched. When
HEW began compliance reviews of the nation's largest cities in the early
seventies, it focused on the equality of school programs,1 4 ' the distribution of
faculty members by race, 14 2 and the provision of bilingual education programs
for students of limited English-speaking ability. 143
134. Portland Oregonian, July 3, 1977, § B at 5, col. 1.
135. Id., July 27, 1977.
136. Evans v. Buchanan, 435 F. Supp. 832, 840 (D. Del. 1977).
137. Altevogt & Nusbaumer, Black Parents and Desegregation in Fort Wayne, 16 INTEGRATED
EDUC. 31 (July-Aug. 1978).
138. Chi. Tribune, Jan. 25, 1978, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
139. See, e.g., L. HARRIS, THE ANGUISH OF CHANGE 244-45 (1973); Schwartz & Schwartz, Con-
vergence and Divergence in Political Orientations between Blacks and Whites: 1960-1973, 32 J. Soc.
ISSUES, Spring 1976, at 157.
140. See, e.g., Information prepared by Community Relations Service, U.S. Dep't of Justice, in
122 CONG. REC. S10708 (daily ed. June 26, 1976); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FULFILLING THE
LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE LAW: DESEGREGATION OF THE NATION'S SCHOOLS 145-46 (1976).
141. The lengthy initial HEW outline of the New York City review, for example, did not even
mention the segregation issue. G. ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? SEGREGATED SCHOOLS AND NATIONAL
POLICY 300 (1978).
142. In New York, the extensive faculty desegregation plan that resulted produced a political
uproar. Less attention was given to negotiation of similar plans in Chicago, Los Angeles, and
elsewhere.
143. A federal administrative law judge found Chicago in violation of bilingual education
[Vol. 42: No. 4
Page 141: Autumn 1978]
After federal district judge John Sirica found HEW guilty of failing to
enforce its own Title VI regulations, the agency was forced to initiate fund
cut-off proceedings against a number of major school districts based on the
violations disclosed in its investigations. 44 Faced with the prospect of losing
federal aid, Chicago, New York City, and other school systems agreed to plans
to redistribute their teachers proportionately across all schools.1 45 Many other
districts agreed to similar requirements in order to be eligible for Emergency
School Aid Act (ESAA) funds. 14 1
Faculty desegregation has long been recognized both by the courts1 47 and
by many social scientists1 48 as a vital component of successful school desegre-
gation. Without ending faculty segregation, the racial identifiability of schools
would remain and students would lack role models of adult integration and
the opportunity to relate to adults of their own and other racial and ethnic
backgrounds.
There is no theory, however, to suggest that faculty desegregation in itself
has significant positive impacts. The identity of a school with virtually all His-
panic students, for instance, is not significantly changed by the arrival of a
few Anglo or black teachers. Nor is it clear that there will be any significant
impact when a few Hispanic teachers are assigned to work in an all-English-
language school. When student and teacher desegregation occur together, the
entire school is fundamentally reconstituted, providing an opportunity to de-
velop a new educational program responding to more diversified needs. Fac-
ulty desegregation without student desegregation produces a far more am-
biguous transformation, which may sometimes be counterproductive.
4. "Equal Opportunity" Through Segregation
Another example of policy development without any empirical basis is re-
flected in HEW's conclusion that the problem of Hispanic children was not
one of segregation but of language. Noting the low achievement scores of
requirements on February 15, 1977. Chicago responded by negotiating an extensive agreement to
avoid the loss of federal aid.
144. Brown v. Weinberger, 417 F. Supp. 1215 (D. D.C. 1976) (Northern and Western school
districts). See also Adams v. Califano, 430 F. Supp, 118 (D. D.C. 1977); Adams v. Weinberger, 430
F. Supp, 118 (D. D.C. 1977); Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D. D.C. 1973) (Southern
school districts).
145. Chi. Tribune, Oct. 13, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1977, at 27, col. 1.
146. Emergency School Aid Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 321(a)-(c), 90 Stat. 2216-17
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1619 (Supp. V 1975). The purpose of this act is to provide finan-
cial assistance to school districts to help them eliminate minority group segregaton and discrimi-
nation among students and faculty in public schools and to aid school children in overcoming the
educational disadvantages caused by minority group isolation.
147. Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965).
148. See, e.g., Report of Dr. Thomas Pettigrew to the Superior Court of the State of California
for the County of Los Angeles in Crawford v. Board of Education, November 14, 1978, pp. 22-23.
Crawford v. Board of Educ., 17 C.3d 280, 551 P.2d 28 (1976).
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Hispanic children, HEW blamed English-language instruction, English-
language tests, and cultural bias in the curriculum. The appropriate remedy
was defined as implementation of a bilingual-bicultural school program. Al-
though there appeared to be no evidence that such programs would work and
although a large majority of Hispanic children knew sufficient English to
function in regular classrooms, HEW halted its investigations into segregated
schooling and required school systems to adopt the new educational ap-
proach.' 49 Scores of districts complied, often relying on federal bilingual pro-
gram funds to finance the changes.1 tS A recent study has found that these bi-
lingual programs are highly segregated and that project directors seldom
transfer children back to English-language classrooms after they have mas-
tered the English language.1 5' The first national evaluation of federal bilin-
gual programs, published in 1977, found no evidence that the programs im-
proved either academic achievement or attitudes toward school. There was
even some highly controversial evidence that children enrolled in bilingual
programs were less likely to improve their English language skills than chil-
dren for whom no program was provided. 5 ' Though the justification for the
displacement of desegregation by bilingual remedies was on the basis of edu-
cational needs, the movement proceeded without any initial evidence and
grew in spite of continued disappointing research results. The advantage of
this approach, however, was that it could be implemented with little visibility
or controversy since its impact was almost wholly limited to segregated minor-
ity communities.
5. Other Alternatives to Desegregation
The intense resistance to desegregation has stimulated a continuing search
for some other solution to the problems of discrimination in urban schools.
The solutions most frequently discussed in Congress and sometimes consid-
ered by the courts include additional resources for education in segregated
schools and more positions in school administration for nonwhites. Providing
additional resources to ghetto and barrio schools rather than integrating them
has been a strong and continuous theme. It is reflected in the largest federal
aid-to-education program, Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education
149. For a full account of the development of HEW enforcement procedures, see G. ORFIELD,
supra note 141, ch. 7, 9. See also Roos, Bilingual Education: The Hispanic Response to Unequal Educa-
tional Opportunity, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Autumn 1978, at 111.
150. N. EPSTEIN, LANGUAGE, ETHNICITY, AND THE SCHOOLS: POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR
BILINGUAL-BICULTURAL EDUCATION 2, 14-15 (1977) (Institute for Educational Leadership).
151. AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH, EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF ESEA TITLE VII
SPANISH/ENGLISH BILINGUAL EDUCATION PROGRAM (1977).
152. Id. at xxx-xxxi. Both the methodology used by this evaluation and the conclusions drawn
have been strongly criticized (see sources cited in Roos, supra note 149, at 111, n.64) and the
results must be regarded as very tentative. Nonetheless, there is no convincing evidence for the
contrary proposition.
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Act,1 5 3 which channels funds for compensatory and remedial programs to
schools with concentrations of poor children. President Nixon's 1972 legisla-
tive proposals offered aid to improve inner city schools as an explicit alterna-
tive to desegregation. 54 Legislative proposals to provide substantial funds to
these schools, however, have fared very badly on the floor of Congress. 55
The emphasis on the compensatory program alternative occurred in spite
of research showing generally negative evaluations of their educational im-
pact. 15 6 When HEW Secretary Richardson testified in behalf of the Adminis-
tration's bill in 1972, he indicated that there was evidence that desegregation
had a positive effect on achievement greater than or equal to that of compen-
satory programs, which the Nixon Administration proposed to substitute for
desegregation.1 7 The negative evidence on compensatory programs was only
brought into the policy debate when President Nixon used such evidence to
justify his vetoes of education appropriations and when the Supreme Court
sought to justify its decision in Rodriguez refusing to overturn inequitable state
school finance systems." 8 Policymakers insisted that compensatory programs
worked when desegregation was threatened, but contended that these pro-
grams were useless when redistribution was proposed.
Compensatory education as an alternative to desegregation is implicit in
the Supreme Court's second Milliken decision.1 5 9 Three years earlier, the
Court had rejected a metropolitan area desegregation plan as a remedy for
the de jure segregated school system of Detroit.6 0 When the case was re-
manded to the federal district court, a very limited desegregation plan was
approved-one confined to the Detroit school district and involving the reas-
153. 20 U.S.C. § 241a (Supp. V 1975).
154. Special Message to the Congress on Equal Educational Opportunities and School Busing,
PUB. PAPERS 425-43 (March 17, 1972).
155. Congressional Research Service shows substantial declines, in constant-value dollars, in
the amounts appropriated for the major federal compensatory and desegregation programs be-
tween the early and mid-seventies. See SENATE COMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES, 95TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., DESEGREGATION AND THE CITIES-THE TRENDS AND POLICY CHOICES 39 (Comm. Print 1977)
(prepared by G. Orfield).
156. See T. Thomas & S. Pelavin, Patterns in ESEA Title I Reading Achievement (1976), for
summaries of much of the earlier research literature on this compensatory program. The first
major evidence that additional resources have little impact on achievement was in the 1966 Cole-
man Report.
157. Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1972: Hearings before Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, Subcomm. on Education, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 289 (1972) (testimony of HEW Sec. Elliot
Richardson).
158. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23-27 (1973).
159. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
160. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). The district court had noted that "relief of
segregation in the public schools of the City of Detroit [could] not be accomplished within the
corporate geographical limits of the city," since the school population at that time was already
three-fourths black. Unreported findings of fact and conclusions of law (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28,
1972), quoted in Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 244 (6th Cir. 1973).
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signment of only about a tenth of the district's pupils.16 I The district judge,
however, required the state government to finance various programs in re-
medial reading, counseling and career guidance, multi-ethnic topics, and staff
training. 6 2 The Supreme Court unanimously sustained this unusual order, 63
providing the first definitive judicial recognition of what has become increas-
ingly apparent in research on desegregation-that desegregation is a long
process requiring curricular and other educational changes to make it effec-
tive. I6 4 Nevertheless, the practical effect of the Supreme Court's decisions in
the Milliken cases, first preventing any significant desegregation by prohibiting
a metropolitan area plan, and then providing money for compensatory educa-
tion programs, may be to push frustrated litigants toward the latter as an
alternative to desegregation rather than as a necessary component of desegre-
gation.
In the late sixties, the community control movement, which originated in
Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant in New York, attracted many who thought
that the problems of segregated schools could be solved by turning over the
schools to the black or Hispanic community, which would then run the
schools with minority administrators and teachers. In Atlanta, a "compromise"
was reached in which further efforts toward integration were abandoned in
exchange for the allocation of more administrative positions, including that of
superintendent, to blacks. 16 5 A similar compromise was included in the Dallas
plan 166 and the issue has been raised in other cities.
The community control movement was widely studied. After an initial
burst of writing hailing the idea as a way out of the impasse of big city school
bureaucracies, studies indicated that the actual effect of community control in
New York was serious community conflict with no demonstrable educational
gains. 6 7 Nor is there much evidence that minority teachers would be more
161. 402 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
162. Discussed in Milliken I, 433 U.S. at 275, 276 & 294 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
163. See discussion of this decision in Yudof, supra note 55, at notes 214-226 and accompany-
ing text.
164. See, e.g., Orfield, How to Make Desegregation Work: The Adaptation of Schools to Their Newly-
Integrated Student Bodies, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Spring 1975, at 315.
165. Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ga.), 487 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1973). See D.
Bell, Waiting on the Promise of Brown, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Spring 1975, at 341, 358-59.
This plan was negotiated by Griffin Bell, Now Attorney General. It was strongly supported by
Andrew Young, and by Jimmy Carter (both as governor of Georgia and during his 1976 presi-
dential campaign). Mashek, What Carter Believes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPT., May 24, 1976 at
18-19, 23.
166. The district court's 1976 plan called for ratios of 44% Anglo, 44% black, and 12%
Mexican American in future top administrative appointments. Tasby v. Estes, 412 F. Supp. 1192,
1219 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
167. See, e.g., LEVINE, OCEAN HILL-BROWNSVILLE: SCHOOLS IN CRISIS (1969).
Recent elections to select members to the governing boards under the New York legislature's
watered down version of a community controlled school system produced very little turnout. Only
8% of the eligible voters went to the polls in 1977, and the candidates endorsed by the United
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fair to minority children than Anglo teachers. A study of teacher-student in-
teraction in classrooms in the Southwest, for example, found that Mexican
American teachers were even more inclined than Anglo teachers to reward
Anglo children disproportionately. 6 1 Preliminary research has failed to find
that programs emphasizing the child's language and culture have any signifi-
cant impact on children's attitudes toward school or even on their attendance
rates. n9 It is apparent that minority school administrators confront many of
the same problems of politics, union relations, urban social and economic col-
lapse, and class conflict between teachers and low income students that
afflicted their white predecessors.'7 0 Nonetheless, the idea of transferring
bureaucratic power to minorities as an alternative to desegregating the stu-
dents remains very much alive.
V
POLITICS, LITIGATION AND WHITE FLIGHT RESEARCH
Despite the fact that research on alternatives to desegregation indicates
that they have little educational impact, such research has been ignored, and
the alternatives continue to be promoted. At the same time, research that in-
dicates busing increases white flight has been given close attention. Indeed,
some school districts have commissioned this kind of research for use in
opposing court-ordered busing.
During the Los Angeles school desegregation litigation, the school district
commissioned a survey asking parents whether they would remove their chil-
dren 7 ' from city schools if the court were to require a desegregation plan
that went beyond the school district's proposed part-time voluntary plan.
Since many parents indicated that they would remove their children under
such circumstances, the school district tried to introduce this survey as evi-
dence that a mandatory plan would be counterproductive. The St. Louis
school district followed the same approach. Governor Jerry Brown illustrated
the political value of the issue. He commented that white flight was an ines-
capable "reality" and used this as reason for attacking the judge in the Los
Angeles case:
Federation of Teachers won most of the positions. New York Times, May 18, 1977, § B, at 5, col.
5. Nonpartisan special elections for school board members, however, usually produce a low voter
turnout, particularly in poorer neighborhoods. L. ZEIGLER & M. JENNINGS, GOVERNING AMERICAN
SCHOOLS: POLITICAL INTERACTION IN LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS (1974).
168. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT V: MEXICAN AMERICAN EDUCATION STUDY,
TEACHERS AND STUDENTS (1973).
169. AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH, supra note 151, § VI, at 27.
170. One dramatic indication of conflict between black administrators and black elected offi-
cials was the firing of Barbara Sizemore, the first black woman superintendent, in Washington,
D.C., by the majority black school board.
171. Marylander Marketing Research, Results of the L.A.U.S.D. Survey (1977).
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The philosophers and judges can issue their edicts, but we are a free country,
and if people don't like what they see in the schools, they just get in the car
and go to a private school, move to Ventura, go to Riverside, go to Orange
County and that's exactly what's happening. 1
72
One major conclusion of the white flight research-that the most stable
desegregation plans are not the limited plans but those that are metropol-
itanwidel 7 3-is almost always ignored by policymakers. Although a study of
the St. Louis school district came to this conclusion,1 74 the issue of white flight
was raised instead as an argument for a more limited plan within the city.
Missouri's Senator Thomas Eagleton defended his 1977 break with civil
rights groups on the basis of the negative conclusions of some white flight
research, ignoring the metropolitan issue. He justified his bill stripping HEW
of authority to require busing in urban areas"7 5 because he was convinced that
stable desegregation was impossible in cities with less than 50 percent white
students.1 76 In Kansas City, he charged, HEW was planning on "sprinkling an
ever-dwindling ration of white students among all-black schools.' 77 Local civil
rights leaders on the Missouri Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights replied that if Eagleton's concern was for stable, majority-white
desegregation, he should have supported the Kansas City school board's suit
for a metropolitan plan rather than attacking HEW's more limited authority
to require busing only within school district boundaries. 7 , Once again, a pol-
icy position was justified on the basis of a selective perception of social science
evidence, and a politically-inspired interpretation of its policy implications.
VI
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
At a time when consensus on the legal requirements for desegregation and
on the desirability of urban school desegregation as a policy have broken down,
both better reporting of information on existing research and new research
are needed. The best source of information about the effect of school de-
segregation policies is social science research. Yet a judge or a school official
with the best of intentions could not readily untangle the controversies over
results of research that now spread across several disciplines, sometimes in-
172. L.A. Times, July 24, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
173. Coleman, Liberty and Equality in School Desegregation, 6 Soc. POL'Y 9, 13 (1976). See Rossell,
supra note 94, at 133.
174. H. Schmandt, G. Wendel, & J. Manns, Government, Politics, and the Public Schools: A
Preliminary Study of Three Cities (Sept. 2, 1977) (St. Louis University Center for Urban Pro-
grams).
175. Eagleton-Biden Amendment of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-205, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977).
176. 123 CONG. REC. S10902 (daily ed., June 28, 1977).
177. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 24, 1977, § B, at 2, col. 4.
178. Kansas City Star, Aug. 11, 1977.
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volving highly technical methodological disputes and at other times, simply ad
hominum attacks on the motivations of scholars.
The adversary process tends to exacerbate the problem for two important
reasons. First, both parties tend to seek not the best but the most predictable
witnesses. The primary motivation of the parties is victory, not the discovery
of "truth." This means that judges often see a narrow range of witnesses
strongly identified with particular policy positions. Such evidence is as likely to
deepen confusion as it is to illuminate the choices.
The second problem is financial. Increasingly, school boards are investing
substantial sums of money in research designed to support arguments for
minimal desegregation. Moreover, they have sufficient funds to make effec-
tive use of social science consultants. Civil rights organizations, on the other
hand, have never been able to finance such research. And when they can
afford consultants, it is usually only to draw up a sketchy "nuts-and-bolts"
plan estimating the number of children that would have to be reassigned in
order to desegregate the school district.
A more useful approach for a court or other agency dealing with a large
city school district would be to create an independent group of experts to
respond to questions formulated by the judge or agency. This group could
assess the existing research on various issues, initiate short-term research where
needed, and report its conclusions. The contending parties should also have
access to the data, and the right to question the experts when they submit
their report.
This procedure, of course, would not solve all the problems. Where the
existing research is inadequate, or where existing findings are unclear or
contradictory, all the experts could do is report that there are unresolved
questions or that the existing research has nothing of value to say. The inde-
pendent panel would be useful in pointing out clearly spurious claims or mis-
leading use of data by one or both parties. It could also inform the
policymakers of trends and elements of consensus that have emerged from
research across the country. The process would not produce a desegregation
plan but would give policymakers an opportunity to use social science infor-
mation more realistically as one element in their decisionmaking. 1 79
The contribution that social scientists can make to desegregation policy has
been limited in part because of the lack of a national commitment to doing
sophisticated research on desegregation during the seventies. Major urban
school busing plans have been implemented in the past seven years, yet there
179. Courts could enlist social science experts in improving the process of monitoring com-
pliance with court orders. Well designed survey research of students and teachers, for example,
would provide a valuable supplement to school district reports and the observations of monitor-
ing committees.
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is no ongoing national assessment of these plans. Not even the relatively
simplistic kinds of data used in the 1966 Coleman Report are now being sys-
tematically collected. In order to obtain more useful information from social
scientists, research-and more adequately funded research-must be under-
taken on general urban trends that will shape the context within which de-
segregation issues should be considered. Congress should direct HEW to ini-
tiate a long-term multidisciplinary assessment of the desegregation process to
gain an understanding of the conditions under which desegregation works
best.
Those federal agencies that have sponsored research and evaluation
studies recently' 8 ° have done a poor job of disseminating them to the
academic community. This research, which contains important evidence of
some of the factors that make desegregation succeed or fail at the school level,
has not had much impact on policymakers or the academic research commu-
nity. The first step-federally-sponsored conferences, seminars, and work-
shops on these and similar studies-would be useful both in expanding ways
of thinking about the desegregation process and generating discussion that
could help shape priorities for a national assessment of the desegregation
process.
The second step is to initiate research on the relationship between the
effects of school desegregation and other urban policies. Federal and local
housing authorities in several communities have been found guilty of inten-
tionally segregating portions of the housing market. As the courts attempt to
remedy both kinds of segregation and as civil rights groups, in order to prove
a constitutional violation in a school desegregation case,' use evidence that
neighborhoods were intentionally developed in a way that guaranteed segre-
gated schools, research on the interaction between governmental housing and
school policies is needed. Such research might also aid in shaping mutually
reinforcing remedies for both segregated schools and housing.
If research is to play a more useful role, researchers must recognize that
some of the serious wounds of the recent controversies have been self-
inflicted. Researchers who find themselves in the unusual and understandably
gratifying position of being asked for advice on issues of general social policy
often express their general value preference, though it may go far beyond the
boundaries of existing research. Policymakers and journalists frequently do
not understand the limitations of existing research and press for advice where
180. See, e.g., G. Forehand, M. Ragosta, & D. Rock, supra note 49. J. Coulson, National Evalu-
ation of the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA) (System Development Corporation, Santa Monica,
1976). The Coulson study was the first of a series of evaluation studies that studied the effect of
desegregation in a sample of schools across the country over time.
181. See Taylor, The Supreme Court and Recent School Desegregation Cases: The Role of Social Sci-
ence in a Period of Judicial Retirement, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Autumn 1978 at 37.
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no reliable information exists. On receiving information, they seldom sort out
the components that rely on research evidence, those that express the re-
searcher's current hypotheses, and those that merely reflect his value prefer-
ences as a citizen. Social scientists must operate with full awareness of these
problems and make every effort to separate their roles as clearly as possible.
At best, the relationship between academics and policymakers will be dif-
ficult. Selective perceptions of research findings and politically inspired mis-
use of data will continue. Careful, self-conscious handling of a complex set of
responsibilities and a variety of audiences is essential to useful participation by
social scientists in the policy arena. Judges and other public officials must
have a more realistic understanding of the way academic researchers operate
and the kinds of advice they are best equipped to provide. Developing a bet-
ter relationship will require important changes in procedures and expecta-
tions. It is, however, the only way substantially to improve the quality of evi-
dence available for making wise decisions about the future of race relations in
enormously complex urban settings.
